Long heralded as a water resource boon of immense benefit to the state, the Central Arizona Project (CAP) is now a source of frustration and controversy. Following five decades of project planning, about 20 years of construction, and the expenditure of about $3.6 billion, CAP water flows hundreds of miles from its source into central Arizona, and is not a particularly desired commodity. Insufficient water is contracted for sale to support and repay the project. Thus arises the CAP underutilization controversy.
A participant at the Arizona Section of the American Water Resources Association fall symposium, "Central Arizona Project Utilization: A Dialog," dramatized the crisis by describing a scene: Cars are speeding at 70 mph from different directions toward an intersection, and although bystanders observe the scene and anticipate the unfolding calamity, they are not prepared to avert it. The brief fable makes several points. For one, disaster threatens. Also conveyed is a sense of inevitability. Events are rushing toward a traumatic conclusion.
What the above story also represents, possibly over-dramatically, is a building sense of urgency that a CAP rescue operation is needed to head off troublesome consequences. If not portending an unavoidable disaster, the pending finale of CAP is raising controversies, many with roots in the early history of the project and others of more recent origin, that now beg resolution.
Brief History of CAP
Initially agriculture was to be the prime CAP beneficiary. Founded in 1946 to promote Congressional approval of CAP, the Central Arizona Project Association described itself as "an Association of agricultural, business, professional, and industrial people whose purpose is to obtain supplemental water for Arizona's agricultural economy." Those were the early days of CAP when varied interests worked together toward a compatible goal.
CAP was to provide water to increase agricultural acreage within the state. More water meant more irrigated acres, a benefit considered to be self-evident. Agricultural conditions had changed, however, by the time the project was authorized in 1968. Groundwater overdraft had become a concern, and no additional land could be irrigated. CAP became viewed as an agricultural rescue operation, providing surface water to replace the increasingly expensive groundwater pumped from a dropping water table.
CAP's purpose was refocused again in the late 1970s. Although agriculture still was considered important, the significance of non-agricultural interests, specifically municipal and industrial (M&I), increasingly was recognized. Perceiving a future non-agricultural need for CAP water, planners devised a method to accommodate present agricultural needs while arranging to serve an expected growing non-agricultural CAP market.
The plan called for agriculture to be the principal user of CAP water during the early years of the project. It was expected that the quantity of water delivered initially would exceed the needs of the non-agricultural sector. Over time, however, CAP allocations were to be shifted from agricultural uses to meet growing non-agricultural needs.
It was argued that it made good economic sense for agriculture to use project water. The cost of pumping groundwater, agriculture's primary water resource, was expected to rise due to the need for deeper pumping lifts, higher energy costs, and increased government regulation of groundwater use. CAP water was perceived as a less expensive alternative to groundwater. The value of crops was expected to rise also.
Indians also were recognized as potential CAP program beneficiaries and serving their interests helped justify the project. It had become increasingly apparent that a need existed for water resources to help settle pending Indian water right claims. CAP water could be that resource.
The CAP Underutilization Problem
This brief historical review outlines the purpose and strategy of CAP. That underutilization of CAP water now is an issue demonstrates that things did not work out as planned. Describing what did not work out and analyzing why has become the hot water topic for Arizona. Troubleshooting CAP has become a minor water resource industry in the state.
Anticipating CAP utilization problems, Governor Fife Symington appointed a 16-member Governor's Task Force that met during the first six months of 1992. Its purpose was to propose strategies for Arizona to maintain its Colorado River entitlement. The task force was unable to come up with any major recommendations. Some members claimed more information is needed on the situation.
In response to the CAP Task Force, the governor's office and the Arizona Department of Water Resources requested a CAP study. The result, "An Economic Assessment of Central Arizona Project Agriculture," by Paul N. Wilson, associate professor in the University of Arizona's Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, is a key contribution to the ongoing CAP debate. Wilson's study identifies various areas of concern and, in general, profiles a complex, troubled situation not amendable to easy solutions. Wilson's analysis provides the basis of much of the following discussion.
Wilson indicates that non-Indian agriculture was expected to purchase 60 to 80 percent of Arizona's Colorado River allotment of 1.5-million acre feet during the first few CAP decades. As noted, this would support the project until non-agricultural demand for CAP water increased.
The above scenario, however, did not work out as planned. The expected agricultural demand for CAP water did not materialize. Wilson records that of the agricultural land in the CAP service area of Maricopa, Pinal, and Pima Counties only about 50 percent contracted for project water. The reason for this is easily understood. For many of the districts other less expensive sources of water were available. For example, some districts had access to supplies from the Salt, Verde, and Gila Rivers. Also, some farmers had the option of using effluent or low-cost groundwater, resources of less cost than CAP water.
Of further concern, demand for CAP water from those districts that did sign contracts has not been as great as expected. From 1985, when CAP first came on line, through 1991, water deliveries increased. In 1991 demand for CAP water dropped, from 745,000 acre-feet in 1990 to 420,000 acre-feet in 1991. A projected increase in agricultural use of CAP water in 1992 is the result of Central Arizona's Water Conservation District's (CAWCD) in lieu recharge program which reduced water prices for farmers. The program, however, is temporary and the established prices barely cover operating costs. In 1992 less than half of the CAP-eligible acreage was farmed.
Wilson points to other factors that adversely affected CAP water demand. For one, cotton, a major field crop in CAP districts, has not been profitably cultivated nor marketed during the past few years. Yield per acre has lessened due to various causes, including unfavorable weather conditions and white fly infestation. Also cotton prices have been depressed because of world competition in cotton production and are not expected to improve. Further, financial markets have tightened creating difficulties for farmers to obtain needed loans for producing crops.
Districts contracting for CAP water delivery needed to build distribution systems, at a cost that now returns to haunt them. These districts borrowed over $228 million from the federal government to pay for such projects, with $91 million borrowed from private sources. An assessed tax on each acre in the district with a grandfathered water right provides funds to meet debt obligations. This fixed financial cost adds significantly to the cost of CAP water.
Looming up ahead and adding a sense of urgency to the crisis is the need to start repaying reinburseable project costs to the federal government, a commitment that begins when CAP is officially completed. The amount is figured to be about $2.3 billion. At that time, project users also begin to assume full operation, maintenance, and replacement costs. The official completion date was to be in 1992, with payments to begin in 1993. CAWCD appealed the 1992 deadline, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) granted a year's postponement.
These pending payments constitute yet another burden to the already financially stressed districts. For some, bankruptcy threatens. Strategies of debt restructuring or other types of relief might be needed to salvage these agricultural operations.
What Went Wrong?
In the present situation it is not unreasonable to question what went wrong. What circumstances or events have contributed to the present CAP crisis?
In beginning to seek answers to this question other questions might also be posed: Were early concerns raised about planned CAP operations? If so, were they heeded? If not, why not? An early notice of potential problems might have prompted a head start in addressing concerns.
William E. Martin and Robert A. Young, two former University of Arizona agricultural economists, found early cause to question the perceived benefits of CAP. Their economic analysis of the project led to conclusions that did not bode well for future CAP operations. The researchers saw red at the end of the line.
In an Arizona Review article, published in 1967, before congressional approval of CAP, Wilson and Martin cautioned that Arizona farmers would not benefit from CAP. At that time CAP was heralded as providing relief to farmers whose water costs were rising as groundwater levels dropped. Other costs were also increasing, however, with low crop prices further contributing to economic strain.
The researchers projected that CAP water would be more expensive than groundwater. As a result, farmers who accept CAP water would suffer further economic loss as their per unit cost of production increased. Wilson and Martin perceived CAP as a false messiah.
Martin and Young also cautioned that the cost of distribution facilities for transporting CAP water from the main canal to final users was not being adequately considered. They stated that such costs would .significantly raise the price of CAP water to farmers.
Martin and Young believed the CAP rationale to be narrowly focused. Groundwater overdraft was perceived to be the Arizona water problem, to be cured by importing Colorado River water. The economists argued what should be of prime concern, however, is a strategy to maximize Arizona's economic growth. CAP does not generate benefits in excess of the cost to transport and distribute the water. They claimed a far better solution to Arizona's water problem would be to reallocate available water supplies.
An alternative to CAP was proposed. In brief, the researchers suggested that farmers continue to pump groundwater for as long as they can pay the price. As water costs rise, agricultural acreage in the state will decrease, with a greater proportion of irrigated acreage devoted to high-valued agricultural uses. Agricultural decline thus would be gradual as groundwater overdraft decreases.
In the rush to secure CAP support and approval the warning was not heeded by officialdom. The message in fact suffered a fate less benign than official neglect. It was derided, and its authors declared personas non gratis. CAP had come to represent such a prize that any opposition to its claims and proposed benefits was viewed as treason. CAP had acquired a sense of mission, to be opposed at peril.
The Roots of the Problem
Twenty-five years later researcher Paul Wilson, from the same UA department as Martin and Young, studied the CAP situation. Wilson found clues to the CAP dilemma in early feasibility studies for constructing distribution systems in irrigation districts. Conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) and private engineering firms in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these studies provided documentation to support federal loan approval and the issuance of private securities by water districts for building CAP distribution systems.
Wilson found the studies to be unduly optimistic. More to the point, he found them seriously flawed in four areas. For starters, the studies essentially assumed all CAP-eligible acreage in the delivery areas of Maricopa, Pima, and Pinal Counties would be farmed each year. This was not the situation then nor did it prove to be the case later. From this assumption, profits were then anticipated that in turn inflated the ability-to-pay figure.
Further, the studies anticipated farmers growing more profitable, higher-income crops than had been planted in the past. This profitable crop mix was expected to include lettuce and potatoes, instead of cotton, the dominant crop of the CAP delivery area. For example, the feasibility studies for two irrigation districts, the Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation and Drainage District and the Central Arizona Irrigation and Drainage District, projected a combined lettuce crop of over 27,000 acres annually. In actuality, however, all of Pinal County only averaged 2,600 acres of fall and spring lettuce between 1978-1981.
Also, the growers' ability to pay was figured without due consideration of a farmer's option to use groundwater. It makes good economic sense for a grower to maximize use of the lowest cost water first, then supplement this source with the next less costly supply. This means a CAP farmer primarily would use groundwater, with CAP water serving as a supplementary source. Wilson claims the feasibility studies overlooked this obvious strategy and exaggerated the willingness of growers to purchase CAP water when less expensive sources of water are available, such as surface water, effluent, and groundwater.
Finally, the studies were deficient in analyzing the financial viability of the distribution systems given the routine fluctuations in acreage farmed, crop mix, commodity prices, yields, and other such factors. Uncertainty and variability are agricultural facts of life, not to be ignored by policymakers in determining reliable and accurate economic options. Wilson believes these variables were not properly figured into the feasibility studies.
Not surprisingly the feasibility studies were sufficiently positive to help guarantee funding for the water delivery systems. Interest-free federal loans paid 80 percent of the cost, with private bond sales providing the balance.
The Myth of the West
More than official miscalculations contributed to today's CAP problems. Certain cultural premises or beliefs about the West also boosted the project and promoted its legitimacy. These are worth examining. Not usually the stuff of public policy analysis, these premises nevertheless influenced the making of CAP--and help explain in part its present difficulties.
The West is a land of grandeur, myth and legend. As such the region represents a challenge that was triumphantly met when humans moved in, took charge, and changed the landscape to accommodate the aspirations of ambitious men and women. The West thus was won. That CAP can be viewed as a partial fulfillment of this destiny helps explain some of its promoters' enthusiasm.
The belief that the West was to be won against native and natural obstacles inspired more than just bands of hardy settlers. This myth or ethos pervaded the national consciousness and was expressed in the laws and policies of the United States. It also found expression in the creation of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, authorized by a 1902 reclamation law.
Homesteading provided the strategy to redeem the arid lands of the West, from barrenness to human occupation and use. Homesteading meant farming, and farming in the West meant irrigation, an expensive proposition for individual farmers. Thus the federal government got involved in constructing irrigation projects as part of its homestead policy.
A review of federal commitment to homesteading demonstrates agriculture's favored status in U.S. history. Farming is frequently perceived as a benevolent, almost virtuous activity, of special worth to the individual and to the country. This is a fact with consequences for the later building of CAP. A vote for CAP implied more than supporting agricultural efficiency and productivity. It also was a vote of approval for a particular way of life.
The above provides a background for CAP as a concept or an idea. In a sense, CAP represented a symbol, its achievement an equal if not greater good than any anticipated practical outcomes. This might explain to some extent official resistance to information--even calculated, quantitative data--critical of the project and its expectations.
The Present Situation
The CAP feasibility studies are history. Their consequences, however, live on as current events. An event of current interest and concern is the present financial status of the CAP irrigation districts. Wilson finds the districts' levels of debt high relative to their ability to raise necessary revenues through acreage assessments and water sales. The consequences of this situation are becoming apparent.
Financial stress has prompted four districts to request deferring their federal debt payments, and one district, New Magma, is in arrears. Districts tend to give less priority to federal debt than to private bond obligations since federal debt usually allows more flexible repayment terms.
No CAP districts thus far have defaulted on private bond obligations. The Harquahala Valley farmers, however, came close. The district was in danger of defaulting on its bond obligation and was within several days of declaring Chapter 9 bankruptcy when CAWCD came to the rescue. The rescue operation involved CAWCD purchasing the CAP water rights of about 35 financially stressed Harquahala Valley farmers for $35 million to apply to the Fort McDowell Yavapai Tribe Indian water settlement agreement.
Wilson warns of troubling consequences if default on private bonds does occur. An irrigation district defaulting on a private bond could adversely affect the bond ratings of local public entities, to the disadvantage of future efforts to raise funds. School, road, and fire districts could be particularly affected.
Possible Future CAP Scenarios
From his description and analysis of present CAP agricultural conditions Wilson speculates about possible future scenarios. The scenarios are not offered as distinct and separate options, but rather as interconnected possibilities, with several or all conceivably occurring together.
Wilson is concerned that an enforcement of the take-or-pay provision, as currently set, will have unfortunate consequences. Upon CAP's official completion, non-Indian agriculture will be responsible for payments to the federal government on fixed operation, maintenance and repair (OMR) costs. Per the "take-or-pay" provision in their CAWCD subcontract, the districts are to pay an OMR charge on all water available to agriculture, whether or not it is delivered.
Wilson foresees the largest districts not being able to make payments in compliance with the take-or-pay provision. As a result, they would default on their CAP subcontracts, as they channel their limited financial reserves to service private bond debts. The districts thus would lose their CAP water. The ensuing default and bankruptcy proceedings would result in district reorganizations, with uncertain outcomes.
Wilson speculates that another possibility is that rising cost for CAP water will further discourage agricultural demand. The cost of CAP water is expected to rise when the project is declared officially complete, and federal repayments become due. That contracted buyers are purchasing less than expected amounts also contributes to the rising cost of CAP water. Put off by high CAP water cost, growers and districts will turn to less expensive sources of water. A conceivable consequence could be that demand for CAP water is limited to its use as a supplemental source during peak summer demand periods.
A further CAP acreage reduction, because of adverse agricultural conditions, makes up a final scenario. A reduction of agricultural acreage might be prompted by higher CAP water prices, scarcity of financing, farm bankruptcies, and decisions not to plant in 1993. Wilson figures a one-third reduction of 1992 acreage levels would result in an $94 million aggregate output loss in Maricopa and Pinal Counties, with a reduction of over 1,200 jobs.
Wilson foresees an agricultural strategy of shifting as much of its CAP water allocation and associated debt as legally and economically allowable to other CAP water users, specifically M&I and Native Americans. Without this shift bankruptcy threatens a majority of CAP districts and a significant portion of growers.
CAP obviously is effecting profound changes in Arizona agriculture. Wilson believes some changes ultimately may be for the good. He sees a selection process at work. Growers having the least debt, highest yields, and low-cost, high-production wells will remain in business. In the face of increasing groundwater cost, however, managerial adjustments will be necessary.
For example, farming systems will gain importance, with greater attention focused on the biological and economic interactions between crop rotation, soil management, crop mix, integrated pest control, and other factors. Also, the feasibility of alternative, non-traditional crops will be examined. The surviving farms may well become "the most modern in the world" in crop production and marketing. In sum, surviving central Arizona farms will be more technologically intensive, with less planted acreage producing more value per acre than what prevailed in the past.
Toward a Solution
It is beyond the scope of Wilson's report to propose specific solutions to the CAP underutilization problem. He believes the complexity of the problem defies simple solution and suggests instead a "composite solution, analogous to solving a multi-piece puzzle."
Wilson believes a step in this direction would be the establishment of a multi-agency task force made up of representatives of numerous organizations with a vested interest in solving CAP problems. Such organizations would include, along with CAWCD, BOR, Arizona Department of Water Resources (DWR), and irrigation districts, the business community, Indian communities, Arizona Public Service, and the Salt River Project. The task force would consider means to operationally and financially restructure CAP. Task force members would evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative solutions.
Wilson, however, does suggest what might be an important consideration when working out a solution to the CAP problem. Agricultural and M&I interest should begin by realizing they are economically interdependent. Wilson demonstrates how this economic interdependency works in several areas.
CAWCD's fixed OMR costs are about $30 million, with the cost spread over the total acre-feet (af) of delivered water. With less water delivered, each remaining acre-feet is assessed a higher portion of the fixed OMR costs. If 1.0 million acre-feet (maf) are sold, the OMR payment is $30/af; a reduced sale of 500,000 af would mean a $60/af cost. If agriculture no longer takes CAP water and thus makes no take-or-pay payments, remaining M&I users could find their fixed OMR cost rise to $150/af, resulting in total water costs of about $200/af. Subcontractors now pay $16/af in fixed OMR and an additional $16/af capitalized into the federal debt obligation.
Wilson finds further evidence of economic interdependency in the interest payment agreement on the federal debt for the main canal. The contract specifies no interest payments on the federal loan applied to sections of the system serving agriculture. On the part of the investment to serve M&I users, however, there is a 3.342 percent interest rate over the life of the repayment period. Less agricultural use of CAP water therefore means greater M&I interest payments to the federal government. With no agricultural use of CAP water, estimates indicate a shift of between $10-$60 million interest cost to CAWCD per year during the early repayment years.
Wilson argues that a consideration of this financial interdependency is important when working out solutions to CAP underutilization. A strategy to solve the controversy could involve trading off advantages between subsidized agriculture and greatly increased M&I taxes and urban water costs.
Wilson suggests that agriculture would better defend its interests by emphasizing the financial interdependency issue, rather than seek support by arguing its economic contribution to the state. He finds that although agriculture is of great importance to some local communities, its total contribution relative to other sectors of the state economy is not significant. Financial interdependency between the agriculture and M&I sectors is a more demonstrable fact.
Solutions are Proposed
The CAP dilemma is challenging the creative efforts of the best minds in Arizona's water community--and others. What to do? Suggestions are many and varied as befitting the complexity of the issue and the range of involved interests. Following are proposed remedies to what ails CAP. Some were presented at the Arizona Section of the American Water Resources Association's (AWRA) fall symposium.
Larry Linser, DWR deputy director, warns of the importance of Arizona having a proposal demonstrating a viable use of its CAP allocation, to discourage undue federal involvement in the issue. This is no idle threat since U.S. Congressman George Miller, chairman of the House Interior Committee, is expected to conduct congressional CAP oversight hearings at the beginning of the year. With a CAP utilization plan in hand, Arizona could better protect its interests against potential federal actions.
The advice former UA researcher Martin offers in an article, "The CAP vs. Arizona Farmers" in a recent edition of The Arizona Farmer-Stockman, is short on specifics, but very clear in general intent: "The hardest thing for Arizona's civic and government leaders to do will be to admit that building the CAP was unwise. Their decision now should be how to cut Arizona's losses--not how to throw good money after bad in an effort to use CAP water at any cost."
An early suggested solution of what to do with CAP water is to lease unused Arizona supplies to California and Nevada, states in need of additional water resources. Arizona then would reclaim its water when needed. Official are concerned, however, that water once leased may prove to be forever lost to the state.
Central to any solution to the CAP dilemma is the plight of agriculture and what to do about it. CAP agriculture obviously is in need of debt relief, and the question is whether such relief should be provided and, if so, what form it would take and who should pay and how much?
BOR and CAWCD jointly produced a "White Paper" outlining a concept for resolving the CAP underutilization problem. The paper begins by acknowledging that "some of the original assumptions used in projecting the project's financial structure are no longer valid." A paramount need according to the report is to save CAP agriculture from bankruptcy. Debt relief therefore is in order, provided mainly by tax payers and municipal water users. This hits a sensitive chord among some urban interests who are wary of contributing to a rescue operation of CAP agriculture.
For example, Roger Manning of the Arizona Municipal Water Users Association sees no justification for taxpayers to assume the districts' distribution system debt. He claims this strategy would not ensure the long-term viability of CAP. Instead he calls for a basic restructuring, with districts, if unable to meet CAP debts, giving up their contractual rights to project water. CAP water resources then would be reallocated to urban users who would directly benefit from the increased tax and water rate payments. The argument is that if agriculture keeps its CAP assets, it can also keep it CAP liabilities.
CAP underutilization is often viewed mainly as an issue between agricultural and M&I interests, the two major players. There are other interests, however, that could benefit from access to CAP water. For example, Indian tribes with unsettled water claims consider underutilized CAP water as a possible resource to include within settlements.
Some support also exists among the non-Indian community for CAP water to be used to settle Indian claims. CAP water thus would be more fully utilized, and any justification for the out-of-state use of CAP allocated water would be lessened. Fuller CAP utilization is the best response to California and Nevada's requests for CAP resources.
Using CAP water to settle Indian claims has another possible benefit. M&I water users are obligated to repay the federal CAP loan with interest, and farmers must repay but without the interest charge. The federal government, however, substantially contributes to Indian repayment obligations, even the capital costs of building a water delivery system. The cost of CAP thus would be shared with the federal government acting in behalf of tribal interests.
Some tribes however have expressed reluctance to accept CAP water as part of a settlement. Underutilized CAP water is agricultural water and therefore of low priority. Tribes prefer senior rights to Colorado River water for settlement.
Some observers are concerned that some tribes do not have an economic use for large quantities of water and would be in a situation similar to that of Arizona's non-Indian farmers. One tribal use of a CAP allocation would be to lease water to urban interests. Such arrangements has been worked out in some settlements.
Environmental interests perceive the availability of underutilized CAP water as a promising opportunity. For example, such water could be used to support fish and wildlife in various areas within the state. Or the out-of-state sale or lease of CAP water could provide funds for an endowment to support environmental mitigation measure. Some discussion is underway about forming a task force to examine environmental uses for underutilized CAP water.
Dale Turner of the Sierra Club proposes an environmentally friendly use of CAP water that combines mitigation measures with the acquisition of funds. The Cienega de Santa Clara, the largest wetland in the Sonora desert, is located in the Colorado River delta in Mexico. The flow to the cienga is expected to be greatly reduced when the Yuma desalting plant is fully operating. Environmental damage will result. Turner suggests that Arizona sell its CAP water to BOR to enable the federal agency to preserve the Cienega de Santa Clara.
CAP, An Ongoing Story
Any discussion of the CAP underutilization issue at this time ultimately must be inconclusive, with the final word far off. CAP underutilization is an ongoing issue that will be influenced by present and future political variables, some presently unknown. As an indication of the volatility of the issue, three speakers at the AWRA conference began their presentations by remarking that they had adjusted their prepared statements in light of what was said by previous speakers. Positions still are being worked out.
In a recent development, Governor Symington has appointed another task force to study the CAP issue. Chaired by the Governor, the 28-member task force will examine options to increase Arizona's utilization of its Colorado River allotment by using the resource to help meet Groundwater Management Act mandates. The task force also is to review strategies for preventing other states from gaining access to Arizona's allotment. The task force had its first meeting in January.
Some Arizona officials are wary of certain developments in Washington, D.C. It is apparent that Congressman George Miller of California, who is chairman of the House Interior Committee, is critical of CAP. For example, Miller was very critical of BOR and CAWCD's request for a year's postponement of Arizona's CAP repayment to the federal government, a request based on the position that the project was not yet complete. Miller complained to Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan that CAP was in fact complete and that repayment should begin. He also found fault with the $35 million payment to salvage the Harquahala Valley Irrigation District from bankruptcy.
What motivates Miller's opposition is debated. Some Arizona officials view his position as part of a California strategy to obtain Arizona's CAP allocation. In its seventh straight year of drought, California clearly is in need of additional water resources. Miller has complained that Arizona has not properly considered leasing unused CAP water to states in need, specifically California and Nevada. Miller is expected to conduct CAP oversight hearings at the beginning of the year.
Some officials therefore fret about Miller's designs on Arizona's Colorado River allotment and his power to exert unwelcomed federal pressures on resolving the CAP issue. They view him as standing solidly in the way of any hope that Washington might help rescue the foundering CAP.
Some people interpret Miller's CAP opposition in a different light. They claim his CAP opposition is consistent with his commitment to reform western water policy and ask: "How could a western water reformist not be critical of some CAP developments?" Also, they say that by opposing further federal CAP support, Miller is in fact protecting the interest of U.S. taxpayers. These motivations, as well as the interests of California, explain Miller's actions.
Some Arizona officials take comfort from Bruce Babbitt's appointment as Secretary of the Interior. They claim Babbitt now is in the position to check Miller's alleged plans to assail CAP to gain advantage for California. Further, Babbitt now could marshall federal aid to support the troubled CAP.
What role Babbitt plays in CAP affairs remains to be seen however. Some observers claim that Babbitt, like Miller, believes in the need to reform western water policy and that the two officials are more likely to agree on most water issues than disagree. These observers question to what extent Babbitt would compromise national reformist goals to gain "local" CAP advantages.
Conclusion
The times are out of joint for CAP. This water resource enterprise had the misfortune of originating during the era of big water projects and of being completed in the present period, a time of fiscal restraint and professed environmental consciousness, when water conservation is a way of life.
There is, however, more to the CAP problem than just timing. A review of the rise and present fall of CAP represents a study of public policy making. With the public good proclaimed the rule, public policy making can be described variously as an art, a gladiatorial contest, and a give-and-take process as several, sometimes competing factions, each motivated by self-interest and often guided by limited and inadequate information, work out strategies amidst changing political and economic realities. The process is not unlike shooting at several moving targets at the same time. Some CAP flaws can be attributed to this process.
Identifying what went wrong is the first step toward determining how to make CAP a viable and appropriately utilized water resource. The present period is a time of analysis and self study to better understand the underutilization issue and what can be done about it. Part of the process involves various parties working out what they perceive to be in their best interest. This then becomes the starting point for their CAP underutilization strategy.
Much more has to be done. During the fall AWRA symposium attorney Hugh Holub told a tale of people in a sinking life boat. Instead of joining together to stop the leak and save the boat, the passengers are arguing about who is to blame for the hole and who will pay to plug it. The anecdote is a call to work together to resolve the CAP underutilization problem.
Arroyo, Fall-Winter 1993, Volume 6, No. 3