Skaidra Smith-Heisters1, Abigail M. York1, Hallie Eakin1, Julia Chrissie Bausch1
1Arizona State University
Abigail.York@asu.edu
Throughout the world there are emerging challenges that must be solved through private action for the public good. In cases where the public good is adaptive capacity within a social-ecological system, the collective action problems can be especially difficult and complex. In this study we utilize the empirical case of irrigation in central Arizona to better understand how various policy instruments –incentive, market, and technological standards – contribute to private provisioning of public adaptation goods. We focus on how these institutions create perverse incentives, as well as their potential to create collective action via private provisioning decisions. Our findings suggest that rather than using the existing institutional arrangements for private provisioning of public adaptation goods, policymakers should explicitly consider alternative forms that take into account the threat of climate change and the spatial and temporal variation of this complex urban-agricultural social-ecological system.